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The two workhorse models of trade, Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner, provide leverage in explaining how
societal groups divide over trade protection. Tension between the two trade models has significantly influenced the
scholarship of trade politics, with explanations of trade politics adopting either the factor-based approach or the
industry-based framework. No study has investigated how changes in factor mobility as a continuous variable
influence the change in trade protection as a policy outcome. Building on recent scholarship on factor mobility,
this article models explicitly how intersectoral labor (im)mobility and political competition between parties affect
changes in trade protection in majoritarian democracies. The theoretical model predicts that when intersectoral
labor mobility decreases governments in majoritarian democracies are more likely to raise trade barriers. We test
this prediction in a time-series, cross-sectional sample of 32 OECD and non-OECD majoritarian democracies
observed between 1980 and 2000. The empirical results corroborate our theory and remain robust when we control
for alternative explanations, employ different estimation techniques, and use different measures of trade protection.
C
onflict over trade policy is a constant feature
in the national political arena of any democ-
racy. Societal groups and economic sectors
who benefit from international trade are locked in a
perennial struggle with others who lose to import
competition, as each side attempts to press the gov-
ernment to enact its preferred policies. Two long-
established economic models of trade enable us to
anticipate how societal groups will divide over this
issue. The standard Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model
assumes that factors are mobile between sectors and
concludes that trade preferences form along factor
lines. In contrast, the Ricardo-Viner (R-V) model
assumes that factors are immobile between sectors
and predicts trade preferences according to industry-
based divisions. Tension between the two trade
models has significantly influenced the scholarship
of trade politics. Explanations of trade politics have
adopted either the factor-based approach1 or the
industry-based framework.2 Empirical tests of these
two approaches have produced mixed evidence.3 The
rare effort to integrate the two approaches has largely
been thwarted by their diametrically opposed as-
sumptions regarding factor mobility between indus-
tries in a country.4 Only recently have scholars begun
to relax the simple dichotomous assumption on
factor mobility, conceptualizing it as a continuum
that varies between countries and over time, and thus
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1Studies that use the factor-based approach include Rogowski (1987), Milner and Judkins (2004), Dutt and Mitra (2005), and Milner
and Kubota (2005). Baker (2005) extends the Heckscher-Ohlin model to explain trade policy preferences at the individual level, while
Frieden (1991) uses the same model to examine the politics of financial liberalization.
2See, for example, Lavergne (1983), McGillivray (2005), and Grossman and Helpman (2005).
3Magee (1978) and Irwin (1994, 1996) find that lobbying activity and political cleavages with respect to trade policy in the United States
follow industry rather than factor lines. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find that the Heckscher-Ohlin
model accounts for trade policy preferences using American and cross-national survey data, respectively.
4Mayer (1984) integrates the median voter model of majoritarian electoral politics with the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the specific
factors model. Although his model produces novel insights, it conceptualizes factor mobility in dichotomous terms. This is not only
empirically unrealistic but also weakens the explanatory and predictive power of his model.
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opening the door for integrating the factor-based and
industry-based approaches to trade politics.5 So far,
however, no study has investigated how changes in
factor mobility as a continuous variable influence the
change in trade protection as a policy outcome.6 This
article takes a first step in filling this important gap.
In this article, we initiate a rigorous analysis of the
impact of labor mobility (or lack thereof) on trade
policy. We choose to focus on the following question:
How does the degree of labor (im)mobility (i.e.,
specificity) affect changes in trade protection in major-
itarian democracies? To address this question, we build
on Mayer’s (1984) model of trade policy to derive the
conditions under which political parties have incen-
tives to increase or decrease trade protection, but
unlike Mayer’s (1984) model that formalizes fac-
tor mobility in dichotomous terms, the degree of
intersectoral labor mobility is formalized here as a
continuous parameter. In our model, specific-type
(mobile-type) voters face high (low) adjustment costs
when changing jobs between sectors and hence, ration-
ally prefer high (low) tariffs. As the median voter’s
labor specificity increases, the median voter prefers
trade protection. To maximize votes, political parties
in a majoritarian democracy will pander to the median
voter and raise tariffs in equilibrium. We find strong
empirical evidence for our argument in an analysis of
32 OECD and non-OECD majoritarian democracies
observed between 1980 and 2000. The empirical results
remain robust when we restrict the sample to either
OECD or non-OECD countries, vary the model speci-
fication, employ different estimation techniques, and
use several alternative measures of trade policy.
As a limitation, our research focuses on majoritar-
ian democracies only. To generate theoretical insights
into the impact of labor specificity as a continuous
parameter on trade policy, we must rely on a formal
model of politics. The median voter framework,
which we employ here, provides a reasonable char-
acterization of party competition and policymaking
in majoritarian democracies, but not necessarily in
others. Despite this limitation, our study makes
several novel contributions to the literature on trade
politics.
Theoretically, our model is among the first to
formally incorporate and assess how the variation in
intersectoral labor mobility affects the change in trade
protection in majoritarian democracies. The model
treats labor specificity as a continuum rather than a
dichotomy, an advance over previous models of trade
policy (e.g., Mayer 1984). In addition, unlike Hiscox’
(2002) study that focuses only on how varying factor
mobility affects the formation of different political
coalitions in just six countries, we substantially extend
his work to theorize and empirically test how varia-
tion in intersectoral labor specificity affects trade
policy outcomes. Finally, while existing studies fo-
cus on how the strength of political parties and the
geographic concentration of industries explain differ-
ences in trade protection in majoritarian democracies
(Grossman and Helpman 2005; McGillivray 2004),
our study argues and shows empirically that the extent
of labor specificity plays an important role in account-
ing for trade policy formation in these countries.
Our analysis also offers two important empirical
innovations. First, previous empirical work on trade
policy has primarily focused on advanced industrial
democracies (e.g., Ehrlich 2007; Hiscox 2002; Kono
2006; McGillivray 2004; Mansfield and Busch 1995;
Milner and Judkins 2004) and occasionally on devel-
oping countries only (e.g., Henisz and Mansfield
2006; Milner and Kubota 2005). We test our argu-
ment in both developed and developing countries.
Although the theoretical model dictates the empirical
focus on majoritarian democracies, our argument
holds empirically across different development levels.
Second, much of previous empirical research on trade
policy relies on cross-sectional data and studies the
level of trade protection (e.g., Dutt and Mitra 2005;
McGillivray 2004). These analyses find it difficult to
establish causation since cross-sectional association
could be an artifact of unobserved heterogeneity. Our
empirical analysis studies the change in trade protec-
tion in a pooled time-series design, which lends more
confidence to the support of the statistical finding for
the underlying causal mechanism.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First,
we present the formal model under majority voting
and the implications from this model. In the follow-
ing three sections, we describe our empirical research
design, statistical findings, and robustness tests. In the
last section, we conclude the article with a discussion
of the implications of this study.
The Model
We build on Mayer’s (1984) seminal work and of-
fer a Downsian model to study how intersectoral
5Hiscox (2002) is the first to provide careful and systematic
evidence for how variation in intersectoral labor mobility affects
the formation of different types of political coalitions in six
advanced industrial democracies.
6Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) recognize that variation in
intersectoral labor mobility may affect trade policy, but do not
explicitly theorize or statistically assess the relationship.
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labor-specificity in tradable sectors influences trade
protection in a majoritarian democracy. While our
model shares some important similarities with
Mayer’s (1984) model, there are crucial differences
as well. First, unlike Mayer’s model which assumes
that labor is perfectly mobile across sectors, we
assume that the labor market has imperfections and
nominal rigidities that impede mobility. Second,
Mayer (1984) assumes constant returns to scale in
production in his model, while we assume weakly
increasing returns to production.7 Third, Mayer’s
model studies how relative endowments influence
tariffs, while we focus on how variations in labor
specificity among voters in tradable sectors affect
trade protection. These differences between our
model and Mayer’s (1984) have important implica-
tions that are explored below. We focus on intersec-
toral labor specificity across all the main tradable
sectors since (1) our objective is to explain how the
extent of labor specificity within the aggregate labor
force affects voters’ preferences over trade protection
in a majoritarian democracy and (2) because our
model focuses on goods produced in tradable
sectors.8
To maintain analytical tractability, we adopt
some simple modeling assumptions. First, we assume
that the formation of single party majority govern-
ments is common in majoritarian democracies. This
assumption is plausible because studies have estab-
lished that single party majority governments are ex-
tremely common in majoritarian democracies, while
the formation of coalition governments is the norm
in PR systems (Iverson and Soskice 2006). Second, we
assume from Duverger’s law that majoritarian sys-
tems are dominated by two main parties. We submit
that this is a restrictive assumption. To ensure that
our empirical results are not influenced by this
assumption, our statistical analyses control for differ-
ences in the number of political parties, party
strength, veto players, and government partisanship.
Third, following well-known political economy mod-
els of trade in majoritarian democracies by Mayer
(1984) and Grossman and Helpman (2005), the
political parties in our model have information about
the median voter’s preference over trade policy and
thus have incentives to locate their tariff policy
platforms at the median voter’s position to maximize
votes and their probability of survival in office; that
is, parties have incentives to converge to the median
voter’s position. Although scholars such as Cox
(1990) and Myerson (1993) have shown that the con-
vergence result may not hold, we adopt the afore-
mentioned assumption for two reasons.
First, a key theoretical objective of our paper is to
build mathematically on Mayer’s (1984) median-
voter model of trade to understand how the degree
of labor specificity, which is formalized via a con-
tinuous distribution in our model, influences trade
protection in majoritarian democracies. Hence, we
maintain consistency with the Downsian approach
used by both Mayer (1984) and Grossman and
Helpman (2005) to model trade policy in majoritar-
ian countries. Second, empirical analyses of elections
in developed democracies by Huber and Powell (1994),
Powell (2000), and Powell and Vanberg (2000) sug-
gest that on average party positions in majoritarian
systems are closer to the median voter than in PR
democracies.9 In a more extensive (and recent) em-
pirical study of 55 elections across the developed and
developing world from 1994 to 2003, Blais and Bodet
find that in majoritarian systems, ‘‘there is stronger
pressure for each party to adopt positions as close as
possible to those of the median voter’’ (2006, 1260).
Therefore, the Downsian approach we adopt, where
parties have incentives to converge to the median
voter’s position, is empirically plausible.10
The actors in the model are (1) two political
parties (A and B) that want to maximize their pro-
bability of obtaining office, (2) labor-specific (i.e.,
specific-type) voters in tradable sectors for whom
the costs of moving between different sectors is high,
and (3) mobile-type voters who change jobs in dif-
ferent sectors with relative ease. We derive the tariff7We follow Grossman and Helpman (2005) who also assume
weakly increasing returns in production. However, unlike our
model, Grossman and Helpman (2005) focus on the impact of
party discipline and not intersectoral labor specificity on trade
protection.
8As shown by economists such as Blanchard and Katz (1997) and
Rama (2003) workers in tradable sectors form an important
component and the bulk of the aggregate labor force in non-
OECD and most OECD economies since the postwar period.
Thus focusing on workers in tradable sectors—who have prefer-
ences over trade policy—will help us understand how voters’
preferences in the aggregate labor force influences trade
protection.
9In particular, see Table 1 in Huber and Powell (1994) which
summarizes the results they obtain for party (policy) positions in
majoritarian and PR countries.
10That said, we statistically control for those factors in major-
itarian democracies, including the number of political parties,
veto players, government partisanship, and variation in party
strength, that have been previously identified (e.g., Cox 1990) as
weakening the convergence result in the Downsian setting. This
ensures that our empirical results are not driven by the assump-
tion of convergence.
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preference of specific-type voters before reporting the
equilibrium solution and comparative static results.
Consider a two-factor, small-open economy of a
majoritarian democracy that produces two goods:
good g which is the importable and good y which is
the exportable. g is produced with labor and sector-
specific capital. Following partial-adjustment theory
in labor economics (see Hamermesh 1990; Nickell
1985), we assume that the labor market in the econ-
omy is imperfect and characterized by nominal ri-
gidities resulting from structural factors such as
social security systems and minimum wage legisla-
tion that impede intersectoral labor mobility.11 Em-
pirical work by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and
Korenman and Neumark (2000) support the notion
that all countries are characterized by nominal
rigidities that prevent smooth movement of labor
across sectors even when the economy faces exoge-
nous shocks. Since there exists nominal rigidities in
the labor-market, the total return to capital from
producing g is not a strictly but rather a weakly
convex function PðpgÞ where pg is the domestic price
of g. Let y be the numeraire good, which is produced
with one unit of labor per unit of output. We nor-
malize the domestic and world prices of the numer-
aire good to one. g and y are produced under weakly
increasing returns to scale. The economy is populated
by voters where each voter is denoted by i. There are
two types of voters. The first type is the labor-specific
(‘‘specific-type’’) voter denoted as a 5 1, and the
second type is the relatively mobile (mobile-type)
voter labeled as a 5 0. We later relax this dichotomy
and assume that labor specificity among voters is
continuous and normally distributed.
In the model, each voter consumes good g and y.
More specifically, voters receive indirect utility from
three sources. First, the indirect utility for voter i
from consumption is l þ SðpgÞ where S(pg) is the
surplus obtained from consuming g and l is the
voter’s income from labor net of lump-sum taxes and
transfers.12 Second, each voter receives a share from
national tariff revenues. If all world market prices are
normalized to one, the domestic price of g is one plus
the tariff rate, i.e., pg 5 1 + t, where t is the tariff
rate. The tariff revenue from imports M which is
distributed as a lump sum to voters is tM(t) and
M 0ðtÞ, 0. Third, specific-type voters place substan-
tial weight (w) on the gains from capital invested in
producing g because their livelihood is dependent on
g. The indirect utility from capital invested in g is
aðwPðpgÞÞ. From the above information, the indirect
utility for specific-type voters can thus be defined as
v
specific
i ðtÞ5 lþ a½wPðtÞ þ ½SðtÞ þ tMðtÞ ð1Þ
Lemma 1: The optimal tariff rate preferred by specific-
type voters (workers) is tSpecific5 2 gðtÞM 0ðtÞ . 0.
The proof of this lemma, and other results from
the formal model, is in the online appendix at http://
journalofpolitics.org/.
Lemma 1 suggests that specific-type voters ra-
tionally prefer higher and strictly increasing tariffs.
The intuition that explains this result is three-fold.
First, if good g cannot compete against import com-
petition, then specific-type voters, whose incomes are
tied to the economic fortunes of g, face the risk of
prolonged unemployment spells owing to high ad-
justment costs of changing jobs between different
sectors. Second, as labor market imperfections and
nominal rigidities impede intersectoral labor mobi-
lity, specific-type voters find themselves stuck in the
sector threatened by import competition. Third, an
increasing tariff raises the returns to capital invested
in g. This, in turn, directly increases the utility of
specific-type voters. These three reasons motivate
specific-type voters to demand higher tariffs against
imports.13
Given the result in Lemma 1, we examine below
how competition between political parties in a ma-
joritarian democracy affects trade protection. The
extent of each voter’s labor specificity in tradable
sectors is now defined by the parameter aspecifici which
is continuous and normally distributed with cumu-
lative distribution function F. Hence the extent of
specificity among voters in the labor force ranges
from highly mobile to highly specific. Under a
normal distribution, the degree of the median voter’s
specificity is defined as aM while the mean voter’s
degree of specificity is am.14 As mentioned earlier,
there are two parties in the model, P 2 A;Bf g de-
notes the tariff rate proposed by parties and imple-
mented by the winning party in office. The objective
of the two parties is to choose their respective tariff
11Unlike Adsera and Boix (2002), we do not analyze the link
between government spending and trade barriers since it is
beyond the scope of our study. But we control for government
spending in our empirical model when assessing labor specific-
ity’s impact on trade protection.
12Note that @SðpgÞ

@pg ¼ gdðpgÞ, 0 where gdðpgÞ is the
total demand for g.
13If pg increases, the utility of specific-type voters increases for
dð2pðpgÞ

dpg ¼ 2gðpgÞ > 0.
14The median and mean voter’s degree of specificity is equal,
aM 5 am, when ai
specific;Nð0;s2aÞ.
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rate tA, tB to maximize their probability ðp 2 ð0; 1ÞÞ
of winning and then surviving in office,
pðtA; tBÞ for Party A
1 pðtA; tBÞ for Party B

ð2Þ
Both parties have incentives to set their tariff policy
in equilibrium at the median voter’s position to
maximize votes. We formally solve and characterize
the aforementioned equilibrium tariff level from A’s
objective function because in Nash equilibrium Party
B’s optimal tariff choice will be similar. We then
examine how the equilibrium tariff level changes
when the degree of labor-specificity in the economy’s
labor force increases. Since labor specificity in the
economy is normally distributed, Party A maximizes
its probability of surviving in office, it chooses an
optimal tariff rate such that
@pðtA; tBÞ
@tA
5 a
specific
i ðgðtÞ  tM0ðtÞÞ
 amobilei ðtM0ðtÞ  gðtÞÞ
ð3Þ
The derivation of the functional form of (3) is described
in the proof for lemma 1. From (3), we obtain,
Lemma 2: In a symmetric and unique Nash
equilibrium, the optimal tariff rate—which is also the
median voter’s preferred tariff policy—implemented by
the political parties in a majoritarian democracy is:
tA

5 tB

5 tM

[
gðtÞðaspecific
i
þ amobile
i
Þ
M 0ðtÞðamobile
i
 aspecific
i
Þ.
Because the Nash equilibrium tariff level in
Lemma 2 is the median voter’s preferred tariff rate,
A and B have incentives to not deviate from the
equilibrium policy position; they will gather fewer
votes if they do. Comparative statics conducted on
the Nash equilibrium tariff level in Lemma 2 with
respect to aspecifici leads to the main substantive result,
Proposition 1: The Nash equilibrium tariff level
strictly increases when intersectoral labor specificity
increases in a majoritarian democracy. More formally,
dtM

da
specific
i
. 0.
The mathematical basis for the result in Propo-
sition 1 is simple. It suggests that when the degree of
intersectoral labor specificity increases, the distribu-
tion of labor specificity in the economy will become
negatively skewed. As a result, the median voter will
be more immobile than the mean voter and in effect
the median voter will be a specific-type individual
characterized by a high degree of specificity. This is
illustrated in Figure 1, which shows that when labor
specificity increases in tradable sectors within major-
itarian democracies, the median voter’s specificity is
higher than that of the mean voter. Consequently, the
realized equilibrium tariff level increases, as claimed
in Proposition 1. Conversely, if labor specificity is low
such that the median voter’s specificity is lower than
that of the mean voter, the equilibrium tariff level is
lower than the derived Nash equilibrium tariff level.
Hence, less technically, from Proposition 1, we expect
that under the majoritarian system, a rise in inter-
sectoral labor specificity (i.e., a decline in labor
mobility) will lead to an increase in trade protection,
while a decline in labor specificity will have the
opposite effect.
A less technical explanation of the causal intu-
ition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. As suggested
earlier, labor market imperfections and nominal
rigidities impede intersectoral labor mobility. Fur-
ther, the government cannot substantially alter, es-
pecially in the short run, these rigidities in order to
increase the speed of intersectoral labor movements.
Consequently, two effects will occur. First, given
nominal rigidities and thus a weakly convex profit
function, capital is likely to remain immobile. This
will lead over time to an increased concentration of
the labor force across tradable sectors in sector-
specific production. Second, since the costs of chang-
ing jobs between different sectors are high for
specific-type voters, they have incentives to remain
immobile. When the incentives for labor to move
between sectors are reduced and labor remains
concentrated in sector-specific production, the speed
of intersectoral labor adjustment is reduced and the
proportion of specific-type voters increases over time,
i.e., aspecifici . 0.
15
FIGURE 1 Equilibrium Tariff Rate for Increase in
Labor Specificity
α specific
> τM*
τ α
α Mα M = α μ0
τ '
τ M
τ M
τ M*
α Mobile
< τM*
α M
15Specifically, the net flow of new workers in the pool of specific-
type voters will increase if nominal rigidities persist, thus leading
to an increase in the share of specific-type voters.
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As discussed above, an increase in the share of
specific-type voters results in the median voter being
a specific-type individual who from Lemma 1 ration-
ally prefers higher tariffs. Since the median voter
strictly prefers higher tariffs in this case, the two
political parties will have incentives to increase the
Nash equilibrium tariff and not to deviate from im-
plementing higher tariffs, in order to maximize their
votes. Additionally, when labor specificity rises in a
majoritarian democracy, parties will implement
higher tariffs in order to protect specific-type voters
from unemployment owing to import competition,
raise the returns to capital invested in g, and by
implication, increase the monetary benefits received
by specific-type voters in the tradable sector. Less
technically, Proposition 1 implies,
H1: If the degree of intersectoral labor specificity of voters
in the labor force increases in a majoritarian democ-
racy, then trade protection will increase.
Empirical Research Design
We test Hypothesis 1 systematically in several steps.
First, since Hypothesis 1 applies to majoritarian
democracies, we start by testing this hypothesis on
a full sample (including OECD and non-OECD
states) of 32 majoritarian democracies16 between
1980 and 2000 that are listed in Table 1.17 Second,
since non-OECD and OECD countries differ signifi-
cantly along various dimensions (the level of develop-
ment, the extent of labor specificity, etc.), we divide
our global sample into OECD and non-OECD sub-
samples and test Hypothesis 1 within each group.18
Third, we check the robustness of our results, par-
ticularly with respect to a variety of trade-policy
measures described below.
Based on the formal model’s result, our depend-
ent variable should measure the change in trade
protection. The main indicator that we use is the
annual change in the import duty coverage ratio
(Dimport duties), which is defined as the total value of
a country’s import duties divided by the total value of
its imports in a given year (t). Data for this variable is
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
[WDI] (2003) and the Global Trade Analysis Project
[GTAP] (2006), version 6.
For robustness tests, we use three alternative
measures of trade protection. The first measure is
change in collected tariff revenue (Dtariff revenue)
from the World Bank’s WDI (2003). It is defined as
TABLE 1 List of All Majoritarian Democracies in
Sample
Country Years OECD
Australia 1980–2000 Yes
Bahamas 1980–2000 No
Bangladesh 1991–2000 No
Barbados 1980–2000 No
Belize 1980–2000 No
Canada 1980–2000 Yes
France 1988–2000 Yes
Ghana 1980 No
Grenada 1984–2000 No
Haiti 1995–2000 No
India 1980–2000 No
Italy 1993–2000 Yes
Jamaica 1980–2000 No
Japan 1980–1995 Yes
Kyrgyztan 1995–1999 No
Macedonia 1994–1997 No
Malawi 1994–2000 No
Mexico 1999–2000 Yes
Mongolia 1992–1997 No
Nepal 1991–2000 No
New Zealand 1980–1995 Yes
Nigeria1 1980–1982 No
Nigeria2 1999–2000 No
Pakistan1 1989–1999 No
Philippines 1986–2000 No
South Korea 1988–2000 Yes
Thailand1 1983–1990 No
Thailand2 1992–2000 No
Trinidad & Tobago 1980–2000 No
Uganda 1980–1984 No
Ukraine 1994–1997 No
United Kingdom 1980–2000 Yes
United States 1980–2000 Yes
Zambia 1991–2000 No
Notes: Data for coding observed democracies for 1980-2000 with
a majoritarian electoral system is drawn from Golder (2004) and
the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions, Beck et al.
(2001).
16The democracies in our sample satisfy Przeworski et al.’s (2000)
definition of democracy.
17Following Lijphart (1999), the majoritarian sample includes
states with plurality rule, absolute and qualified majority require-
ments, the limited vote, alternative vote or the single non-
transferable vote. Countries with a mixed electoral system that
use the majoritarian and PR system to elect representatives are
excluded since our theory applies only to majoritarian democracies.
18A total of 10 majoritarian democracies are observed in the
OECD world between 1980 and 2000, while 22 majoritarian
countries are observed in the non-OECD world in this time
period.
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change in the ratio of total tariff revenue to the total
value of imports from year t21 to year t. The second
measure is from Hiscox and Kastner (2002). They
generate measures of protection using the importing-
country specific and time-specific effects from an
augmented gravity model where relative factor endow-
ment differentials are used as additional variables to
capture factor-proportions type effects. This measure
captures the implicit protection through substitutes
(including domestic policies adopted) of standard
trade policy measures. We use the change in the
Hiscox-Kastner measure as our dependent variable.
The third measure is an endowment-corrected
measure of trade openness that is operationalized
from Leamer (1988). Following Leamer, our measure
of trade openness is based on the idea that the co-
efficient of trade openness (X + M/GDP) is positively
correlated with the difference in the endowments
between a country and the rest of the world. There-
fore, we estimate the regression
ðX þM=GDPÞit 5 c þ b1 lnðareaiÞ þ b2 lnðgdppcitÞ
þ b3 lnðdistiÞ þ g1D2ikt þ g2D2ilt
þ uðtrendtÞ þ uit
ð4Þ
where ln (areai) is the log of the size of country i in
square miles, ln (gdppcit) is log GDP per capita of
country i, ln (distit) is the average of the distance
between country i and its 20 most important partners
and D2ikt (and D
2
ilt) is the difference between country
i’s and world’s effective endowment of capital (k) and
labor (l) (drawn from Lee 1992 and GTAP 2006).19 A
time trend is included to account for the decline in
transportation costs over time. The residuals from
this regression provide the factor-endowment cor-
rected measure of trade Openness. Since Openness is a
measure of trade openness and not trade protection,
we expect the signs of the coefficients of our
independent variable (labor-specificity) and control
variables to be reversed in models where Openness is
the dependent variable. To save space, we present
below the results from Dimport duties and the change
in the Hiscox-Kastner measure of trade protection.
Results from tests using Leamer’s (1988) measure and
Dtariff revenue are reported in the online appendix.
Before describing how we operationalized the
independent variable, we briefly discuss the correla-
tion patterns among different measures of the de-
pendent variable in our sample. As shown in Table 2,
the change in the Hiscox-Kastner measure is pos-
itively and strongly correlated with Dimport duties
and Dtariff revenue but negatively correlated with the
endowment-corrected measure of trade openness.
This is not surprising given that higher trade barriers
captured by the Hiscox-Kastner measure will be
positively correlated with greater trade protection
and provide more tariff revenue for the government,
but will be negatively correlated with the degree of
trade openness as measured by Openness. In addition,
the correlation between Dimport duties and Dtariff
revenue also is positive and strong in both samples,
while the correlation between Dimport duties and
Openness is negative. These patterns also are expected
since higher import duties will generate more tariff
revenue for the government, but will act as a barrier
to greater trade openness. In short, the different
measures of the dependent variable are highly corre-
lated in expected directions, therein indicating the
underlying consistency across these measures.
Next, we operationalize our independent varia-
ble—the extent of intersectoral labor specificity (i.e.,
the lack of intersectoral labor mobility) in tradable
sectors—for each country-year. We focus on inter-
sectoral labor specificity for two reasons. First, our
formal model specifically analyzes how labor specif-
icity in tradable sectors affects trade protection in ma-
joritarian democracies. Second, as described below, a
key advantage of our ‘‘structural’’ measures of labor
specificity is that they build on partial-adjustment
theory in labor economics which predicts that nom-
inal rigidities in the labor market impede intersec-
toral labor mobility (see Hamermesh 1990; Nickell
1985). Since the formal model considers the impact
of these rigidities on labor specificity, our empirical
indicators of labor specificity allow us to directly test
our model’s implication. Measuring intersectoral
TABLE 2 Correlation Matrix of Measures of the
Dependent Variable
Majoritarian
Sample
DImport
duties
DTariff
Revenue
Change in
Hiscox-
Kastner
Measure Openness
DImport duties 1.00
DTariff Revenue .672 1.00
Change in
Hiscox-Kastner
.590 .451 1.00
Openness 2.376 2.402 2.488 1.00
19D2ikt5 ððEikt  EktÞ=EktÞ2 [D2ilt5 ððEilt  EltÞ=EltÞ2] where Eikt
(Eilt) is the endowment of factor k and l of country i at t and Ekt
(Elt) is the world effective endowment at t.
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labor specificity is difficult. We use two measures for
the degree of labor specificity in each country (see
e.g., Hiscox and Rickard 2002; Wacziarg and Wallack
2004). Both of these measures are structural since they
are based on data that capture labor mobility (or lack
thereof) over time across five main tradable sectors, as
classified by the International Labor Organization
(ILO) and United Nations Industrial (UNIDO): (1)
Agriculture and Hunting, (2) Forestry and Fisheries,
(3) Mining and Quarrying, (4) Manufacturing, and
(5) Transportation and Warehousing.20
Our first measure of labor specificity captures
two effects in the labor market: direct movement of
workers from one sector to another and sectorally
differentiated changes in aggregate employment (re-
sulting from population growth and entry of indi-
viduals into the labor force after being unemployed).
We label this measure as DStrucspecificity. It is opera-
tionalized as an index, which is developed as follows.
First, following Wacziarg and Wallack (2004), we
develop a measure that captures the absolute value of
changes in the share Sts;iof each sector s in total
employment for each country i in any given year t ,
which is:
DShift5 0:5+
S
s
jSts;i  Stds;i j ð5Þ
We let d 5 2 years in the DShift measure because
meaningful shifts in intersectoral labor mobility
typically occur in two years (Wacziarg and Wallack
2004). Further, setting d 5 2 ensures that the meas-
ure DShift is not affected by business cycle effects.
That said, setting d 5 1 or 3 years did not alter the
results reported below. DShift is bounded between 0
(no intersectoral labor mobility) and 1 (complete
intersectoral mobility). Hence DShift captures the
change in intersectoral labor mobility. We then take
the difference between 1 and DShift to measure
DStrucspecificity, which is also bounded between 0
and 1. Higher values of DStrucspecificity indicate
greater intersectoral labor specificity.
The second measure of labor specificity, labeled
DLabor Specificity, focuses strictly on labor movement
across sectors. DLabor Specificity is based on inverting
a well-known measure of intersectoral labor mobility
(see Wacziarg and Wallack 2004). It is developed as
follows. First, intersectoral labor mobility in each
country is computed by isolating the fraction of jobs
that move from one sector to another independent of
overall employment gains or losses. Let EtS;i denote
employment in sector S in country i at time t. Hence
DLabor Mobility5
+
S
s
EtS;i  EtdS;i
  +S
s
EtS;i+
S
s
EtdS;i


1
2 +
S
s
ðEtS;i þ EtdS;i Þ
ð6Þ
The difference in the numerator between the term on
the left and the term on the right gives the employ-
ment changes that result from pure shifts of jobs
across different sectors in the economy. The denom-
inator computes the average of total employment for
the sectors in consideration between t and t2d. As
before, we let d5 2 years to capture meaningful shifts
in intersectoral labor mobility and to minimize the
effects of business cycle shocks. Setting d 5 1 or 3
years did not alter the results reported for this
measure below. We simply use the inverse of DLabor
Mobility to convert it to a measure of intersectoral
labor specificity. Our second measure is thus DLabor
Specificity 5 1/DLabor Mobility. From Hypothesis 1,
we expect that the two measures of labor specificity
will have a positive and significant effect on the change
in trade protection in majoritarian democracies. Data
for our measures of labor specificity are from Interna-
tional Labor Organization database (ILO, 2005) and
the United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-
tion industrial statistics datasets (UNIDO, 2003).
We control for political and economic variables
identified by the literature as important determinants
of trade protection. With respect to political controls,
we follow Milner and Judkins (2004) and include
Presidential Democracy and Federal as dummies that
represent countries with presidential and federal
systems, respectively. We also include Government
Partisanship that is coded on a 0–2 scale with 0
representing right governments and 2 left govern-
ments. Data for these three variables are from the
World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI;
Beck et al. 2001). Milner and Judkins (2004) claim
that the presidential system is more favorable to free
trade, while left governments and federal systems are
more protectionist. We expect Presidential Democracy
to be negative, but Government Partisanship and
Federal will be positive.
We include Taagepera and Shugart’s (1989)
measure of Effective Number of Legislative Parties
(ENLP) since Nielson (2003, 475) claims that greater
party fragmentation in the legislature leads to in-
creased trade protection. Although the literature is
divided over the issue of whether or not more veto
20We exclude the services sector from our labor specificity
measures since Jensen and Keltzer (2005) suggest that services
are in the nontradable sector, thus not applicable to our study.
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players in government leads to higher trade protection
(see Henisz and Mansfield 2006; Milner, Mansfield,
and Pevehouse 2007), we include Veto Players using
data from the World Bank’s DPI (Beck et al. 2001).
McGillivray (2004) and Hankla (2006) suggest that
countries with strong political parties (i.e., party
leaders exercise a high degree of control over party
nominations) will produce freer trade policies. Based
on Carey and Shugart’s (1995) classification, we
measure Party Strength on a 0–2 scale with 0 indicating
low party strength and 2 denotes high party strength.
Party Strength should have a negative effect.
With respect to the economic variables, we in-
clude log (GDP per capita) and log (Population) since
trade protection may be affected by per capita income
and a country’s overall size. We also control for the
change in each country’s real effective exchange rate
(DReal eff exch rate) that is expected to increase trade
barriers and a change in the terms of trade (Dterms of
trade) that will have a negative effect on the depend-
ent variable. Data for these variables are from the
IMF’s Government Financial Statistics and the World
Bank’s WDI (2003). Busch and Reinhardt (1999)
suggest that trade barriers are likely to be higher
in countries where production is geographically
concentrated. We operationalize an index of ‘‘ad-
justed geographic concentration’’ based on a study by
Spiezia (2003) and label this measure as AGC index5
GC/GCMax. The AGC index is a continuous measure
that ranges from 0 (low) to 1 (high geographic con-
centration of production). Data for the AGC index
are from Spiezia (2003) and GTAP (2006). Since
Adsera and Boix (2002) suggest that public expendi-
ture or the size of the public sector may influence the
degree of trade openness, we control for Government
Spending that is measured as the percent of central
government expenditure over GDP. Following Milner
and Judkins (2004, 106), we include Transportation
Costs—operationalized using cif to fob ratios supple-
mented with shipping costs—as a proxy for global-
ization since globalization may force countries to
lower trade barriers. Data for this variable is from the
IMF’s (2004) Direction of Trade Statistics and Hum-
mels and Lugovskyy (2006).
To account for each country’s relative factor en-
dowments in the specification, we introduce the Log
of capital-labor ratio. Data for labor is from the Penn
World Tables (2004) and capital from Przeworski
et al. (2000). Recent studies suggest that the educa-
tional attainment of workers affects trade policy
preferences, which consequently affects trade protec-
tion (Baker 2005; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Scheve
and Slaughter 2001). Therefore, we include from
Barro and Lee (2000) and the World Bank’s WDI
(2003) the percent of the population over age 15 that
has completed secondary education in each country
as a proxy for educational attainment (Education).
Scholars debate whether or not the GATT and its
successor, the WTO have successfully reduced trade
barriers (Rose 2004a; Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers
2007). We introduce the dummy variable GATT/
WTO that is coded as 1 for countries that are formal
members of the GATT (until 1995) and then the
WTO after 1995. Since the size of the agricultural
sector may affect trade protection (Thies and Porche
2007), we control for the size of each country’s
agricultural sector as a percent of GDP (Agriculture
% of GDP). Finally, since the degree of unemploy-
ment benefits available to workers may influence their
incentives to remain specific (Estevez-Abe, Iverson,
and Soskice 2001), we control for Unemployment
Benefits (as % of GDP). Data are from the Interna-
tional Social Security Association (2004) Social Secur-
ity Programs, Vodopivec (2004), and GTAP (2006).
We estimate TSCS regression models with panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE’s) that correct for
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.
Country fixed effects are included in each model. To
account for serial correlation, we include the lagged
dependent variable in the TSCS models (Beck and
Katz 1995). For robustness tests, we estimate the
TSCS models via the Prais-Winsten procedure with
PCSE’s, fixed effects, and an AR (1) parameter, but
exclude the lagged dependent variable. The results
remain robust, though they are not reported here to
conserve space. We also check the validity of our
results by estimating some system Generalized Meth-
ods of Moment (GMM) models that account for
potential endogeneity between labor specificity and
each measure of trade protection used here.
Results
Table 3 reports the results from models that
are estimated with a lagged dependent variable,
PCSE’s, and fixed effects and where the dependent
variable is Dimport duties. Models 1, 2, and 3 use
DStrucspecificity as the key independent variable for
three different samples (all, OECD, and non-OECD
majoritarian democracies), while models 4, 5, and 6
use DLabor Specificity as the key independent variable
for the three samples.
For the entire sample of majoritarian democracies,
the coefficient of DStrucspecificity has the predicted
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TABLE 3 Effect of Labor Mobility on Change in Import Duties in Majoritarian Democracies
DStrucspecificity [0] DLabor specificity
All Model 1 OECD Model 2 non-OECD Model 3 All Model 4 OECD Model 5 non-OECD Model 6
Lagged DV .1254*** (.0433) .1170*** (.0401) .1240*** (.0345) .1615*** (.0410) .2155*** (.0321) .1246*** (.0340)
DStrucspecificity .2429*** (.0701) .2725*** (.0442) .4155*** (.0318)
DLabor specificity .4314*** (.0892) .3114*** (.0442) .5234*** (.1018)
Ln(GDP per capita) 2.0941 (.0829) 2.0863 (.1384) 2.0797*** (.0255) 2.0939 (.0855) 2.0657 (.1071) 2.0563*** (.0134)
Education 2.0379 (.0701) 2.0483 (.0806) .0571 (.0925) 2.0287 (.0460) 2.0312 (.0532) .0260 (.0325)
Ln(Population) .0106 (.0332) .0236 (.0232) .0139 (.0119) .0202 (.0343) .0133 (.0255) .0158 (.0124)
AGC Index .0125 (.0261) .0770*** (.0244) .0697 (.0521) .0137 (.0225) .0621*** (.0215) .0590 (.0322)
DReal eff exch rate .0137*** (.0052) .0752 (.0937) .0814*** (.0308) .0139*** (.0050) .0481 (.0709) .0755*** (.0218)
Ln(Capital/Labor) .0125 (.0261) 2.0432*** (.0124) .0298 (.0377) .0119 (.0182) 2.0588*** (.0235) .0312 (.0406)
Govt. spending .0554 (.1107) .0651 (.1432) .0326 (.0717) .0822 (.1233) .0467 (.1236) .0317 (.0499)
DTerms of Trade 2.0146*** (.0050) 2.0251** (.0103) 2.0797*** (.0255) 2.0165*** (.0043) 2.0182*** (.0061) 2.0353*** (.0095)
GATT/WTO 2.0110 (.0463) 2.0137*** (.0041) .0114 (.0234) 2.0163 (.0384) 2.0160*** (.0035) .0136 (.307)
Party Strength 2.0252 (.0177) 2.0461 (.0435) 2.0859 (.0801) 2.0812 (.0971) 2.0231 (.0646) 2.0344 (.0625)
Veto Players 2.0147 (.0254) 2.0565 (.0618) 2.1143 (.1652) 2.0238 (.0145) 2.0414 (.0568) 2.1210 (.1044)
Partisanship .0101 (.0096) .0152*** (.0047) .0736 (.0761) .0109 (.0088) .0204*** (.0045) .0526 (.0391)
Presidential 2.0179 (.1642) 2.0354 (.0742) .0211 (.5340) 2.0179 (.1605) 2.0311 (.0722) .0481 (.4199)
Federal .0009 (.0307) .0003 (.0508) .0072 (.0341) .0012 (.0198) .0006 (.0327) .0061 (.0416)
ENLP .0379 (.0701) .0406 (.0565) .0299 (.0511) .0216 (.0599) .0412 (.0319) .0297 (.0218)
Transportation costs 2.0089 (.0074) 2.0075 (.0083) 2.0090 (.0097) 2.0099 (.0116) 2.0083 (.0091) 2.0095 (.0108)
agriculture(%GDP) .0216 (.0599) .0307 (.0512) .0249 (.0634) .0115 (.0152) .0226 (.0165) .0317 (.0294)
Unemployment benefit (%GDP) .0115 (.0132) .0122 (.0128) .0173 (.0139) .0121 (.0135) .0111 (.0143) .0132 (.0128)
Constant .1073*** (.0051) .1155*** (.0048) .1303*** (.0118) .1409*** (.0090) .1204*** (.0067) .1326*** (.0098)
Adjusted R2 .317 .399 .324 .328 .407 .305
N 411 152 259 411 152 259
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. PCSE’s reported in parentheses for all empirical models. Each specification estimated with country-specific
fixed effects (‘‘fe’’).
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positive sign and is significant at the 1% level in
model 1, while the effect of DLabor Specificity is
also positive and highly significant in model 4.
These results provide strong statistical support for
Hypothesis 1. Substantively, we find that when
DStrucspecificity rises by one standard deviation above
its mean and other variables in model 1 are held at
their means, the dependent variable Dimport duties
increases by approximately 6%. This substantive
effect is illustrated in Figure 2. Relative to the sample
mean of Dimport duties (4%), this substantive effect
is large.
For both OECD and non-OECD samples, the
coefficients of DStrucspecificity and DLabor Specificity
remain positive and significant at the 1% level in the
relevant models. The substantive effects for both
measures of labor specificity are consistent with
earlier findings. For example, when DStrucspecificity
increases by one standard deviation above its mean,
holding other variables constant, Dimport duties rises
by 7% and 10%, respectively.
Due to space constraints, we briefly discuss the
results for the control variables in Table 3. The effect
of Government Partisanship is insignificant in the full
sample of majoritarian democracies and the subsam-
ple of non-OECD majoritarian countries, but is
positive and highly significant in the sample of OECD
majoritarian democracies. This supports Milner and
Judkins’s (2004) finding that left-leaning govern-
ments are more likely to protect the economy by
raising tariffs in OECD countries. The effects of
Presidential Democracy, Federal, Veto Players, Party
Strength, and ENLP are, however, each insignificant
in the models in Table 3. These results should not be
taken to suggest that these political factors do not
influence trade protection. Unlike existing studies of
trade protection, our sample is restricted to major-
itarian democracies for the specific purpose of testing
Hypothesis 1. The restrictive nature of our sample
may weaken the results for some of the political
control variables. In addition, in contrast to extant
studies, we use the change of trade protection rather
than its level as our dependent variable. Since tem-
poral variations in political and institutional variables
are low, it is not surprising that temporally invariant
political variables have little effect on the change in
trade protection, even though they are shown to
influence the level of trade protection (e.g., Hankla
2006; McGillivray 2004).
Turning to the economic control variables, we
find that log (Population), Transportation Costs, Gov-
ernment Spending, Agriculture (% of GDP), and
Unemployment Benefits (% of GDP) each have insig-
nificant effects in the models in Table 3. The change
in Real Effective Exchange Rate is positive and sig-
nificant in the full sample as expected, while the
change in Terms of Trade is negative and significant
as predicted in each model. The AGC index is positive
and significant for the models estimated for the
sample of OECD majoritarian democracies. This sup-
ports Busch and Reinhardt’s (1999) claim that higher
geographic concentration of production leads to an
increase in trade protection in advanced OECD de-
mocracies. The estimate of log of capital-labor ratio is
negative and significant in the sample of OECD
majoritarian democracies. This fits well with the
prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The
GATT/WTO dummy is insignificant in the global
and non-OECD sample, but is negative and signifi-
cant in the OECD sample.
Robustness Tests
Will the results in Table 3 hold with respect to
alternative measures of the dependent variable? To
answer this question, we estimate the effects of
DStrucspecificity and DLabor Specificity on the change
in the Hiscox-Kastner measure of trade protection in
the three samples. As reported in Table 4, the effects
of both DStrucspecificity and DLabor Specificity are
positive and significant at the 1% level in all three
samples for the Hiscox-Kastner measure.
We also check the effects of DStrucspecificity
and DLabor Specificity on two additional measures
of the dependent variable, namely, Dtariff revenue
and Leamer’s endowment-corrected measure of trade
FIGURE 2 Effect of DStrucspecificity on DImport
Duties in majoritarian democracies
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TABLE 4 Effect of Labor Mobility on Change in Hiscox-Kastner Measure of Trade Protection in Majoritarian Democracies
DStrucspecificity DLabor specificity
All Model 7 OECD Model 8 non-OECD Model 9 All Model 10 OECD Model 11 non-OECD Model 12
Lagged DV .1702*** (.0401) .2104*** (.0618) .2039*** (0.0614) .2064*** (.0492) .1233*** (.0427) .2122*** (.0709)
DStrucspecificity .2980*** (.0972) .3790*** (.1161) .2543*** (.0851)
DLabor specificity .2044*** (.0649) .2925*** (.0872) .1541*** (.0603)
Ln(GDP per capita) 2.0147 (.0254) 2.0361 (.0215) 2.0417*** (.0108) 2.0271 (.0219) 2.0167 (.0102) 2.0340*** (.0115)
Education 2.0295 (.0762) 2.0526 (.0497) .0037*** (.0016) 2.0130 (.0449) 2.0225 (.0170) .0089** (.0045)
Ln(population) .0472 (.0892) .0749 (.0656) .0171 (.0149) .0216 (.0599) .0307 (.0512) .0182 (.0180)
AGC Index .0112 (.0319) .0322 (.0293) .0199 (.0435) .0319 (.0253) .0371 (.0242) .0153 (.0240)
DReal eff exch rate .0126 (.0543) .0155 (.0231) .0396 (.0450) .0101 (.0096) .0150 (.0147) .0258 (.0319)
Ln(Capital/Labor) .0116 (.0191) 2.0225*** (.0063) .0170*** (.0081) .0133 (.0182) 2.0288*** (.0095) .0193*** (.0067)
DTerms of Trade 2.0279 (.0382) 2.0108 (.0477) 2.0039** (.0016) 2.0118 (.0176) 2.0253 (.0441) 2.0075** (.0029)
GATT/WTO 2.0173 (.0193) 2.0140*** (.0038) .0125 (.0143) 2.0136 (.0154) 2.0122*** (.0041) .0119 (.0166)
Govt. spending .0336 (.0229) .0539 (.0616) .0126 (.0130) .0429 (.0371) .0530 (.0324) .0218 (.0175)
Party Strength 2.0415 (.0721) 2.0372 (.0198) 2.0162 (.0739) 2.0526 (.0417) 2.0240 (.0181) 2.0153 (.0546)
Vto Players .0153 (.0818) .0210 (.0637) .0136 (.0151) .0121 (.0755) .0311 (.0245) .0129 (.0136)
Partisans ip .0072 (.0150) .0119*** (.0046) .0048 (.0039) .0065 (.0134) .0098*** (.0031) .0033 (.0021)
Presidential 2.0379 (.0701) 2.0283 (.0806) .0104 (.0499) 2.0433 (.0681) 2.0179 (.0624) .0082 (.0421)
Federal .0054 (.0107) .0063 (.0084) .0094 (.0133) .0041 (.0087) .0059 (.0072) .0107 (.0112)
ENLP .0125 (.0261) .0233 (.0304) .0065 (.1361) .0045 (.0133) .0251 (.0087) .0089 (.0141)
transportation costs 2.0040 (.0086) 2.0029 (.0018) 2.0019 (.0021) 2.0014 (.0026) 2.0013 (.0015) 2.0012 (.0013)
Agriculture(%GDP) .0711 (.0605) .0742 (.0662) .0422 (.0548) .0586 (.0611) .0637 (.0433) .0287 (.0247)
Unemployment benefit (%GDP) .0125 (.0261) .0433 (.0304) .0669 (.0498) .0160 (.0136) .0126 (.0185) .0133 (.0187)
Constant .6051*** (.0735) .8077*** (.0642) .4155*** (.0292) .4287*** (.0450) .6322*** (.0242) .3128*** (.0192)
Adjusted R2 .226 .214 .197 .258 .229 .178
N 411 152 259 411 152 259
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. PCSE’s in parentheses. Each model is estimated with a lagged dependent variable and country-specific
fixed effects.
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Openness. The results for these two measures are
reported in two tables in the online appendix. In both
tables, DStrucspecificity and DLabor Specificity have
the predicted significant effects in all three samples.
We check the econometric validity of our results
by conducting two tests to address the concern that
our measures of labor specificity may be endogenous
to trade protection, even though there is little
econometric evidence for such a possibility at the
aggregate level (see Wacziarg and Wallack 2004). We
first conduct a variant of the Granger causality test
designed for panel data (Hurlin and Venet 2003) to
assess the potential endogeneity problem. The results
from these tests indicate that intersectoral labor
specificity is not endogenous to change in import
duties or other measures of the dependent variable.21
We further address the possibility of endogeneity
by implementing the dynamic panel estimator—
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)—
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell
and Bond (1998). The GMM estimator corrects for
endogeneity by using moment conditions to derive a
set of valid instruments for our endogenous explan-
atory variables. It also addresses the possibility of
serial correlation and allows us to control for country
fixed effects and heteroskedasticity via White’s het-
eroskedasticity consistent standard errors. We follow
Blundell and Bond’s (1998) advice and estimate what
they term a ‘‘system GMM’’ model that involves es-
timation of a single system that combines a regression
in first differences and a regression in levels. The in-
struments for the regression in first differences are
lagged levels (dated t22) of the endogenous explan-
atory variables, while the instruments for the re-
gression in levels are the lagged differences of the
endogenous explanatory variables. Blundell and Bond
(1998) show that estimating the two equations (levels
and differences) in a single system reduces the
potential bias and imprecision associated with just
the first-difference GMM estimator.
In separate system GMM models, we estimate the
impact of labor specificity on Dimport duties and the
change in the Hiscox-Kastner trade protection meas-
ure for the three samples. We report results from the
levels regression in the system GMM model for the
sample of all majoritarian countries in Table 5 and
the results for the other two samples in Table 6.
In Table 5, the effects of both measures of labor
specificity, i.e., DStrucspecificity and DLabor Specific-
ity, remain positive and highly significant in the
system GMM models for the sample of all major-
itarian democracies irrespective of whether we use
Dimport duties or the change in the Hiscox-Kastner
measure as the dependent variable. Further, as
reported in Table 6, the effects of the two measures
of labor specificity are positive and highly significant
in the system GMM models for the samples of OECD
and non-OECD majoritarian democracies, regardless
of whether Dimport duties or the change in the
Hiscox-Kastner measure is the dependent variable.
These results confirm Hypothesis 1 even after cor-
recting for potential endogeneity.
As a final robustness exercise, we estimated all the
models with additional control variables: Industry
value added/GDP, Ln (land-labor) ratio, average dis-
trict magnitude and individual characteristics such as
Age and Female that may affect voters’ incentives to
remain specific. Age is the percent of the labor force
above 60 years, while Female is the percent of the
labor force that is female. Including these additional
controls did not alter the statistical significance or
substantive impact of the reported results. We also
conducted some diagnostic tests of serial correlation,
omitted variable bias and normality of the error
terms for the empirical models, all of which suggest
that the estimates are econometrically sound.22
Conclusion
In this article, we analyzed the impact of intersectoral
labor (im)mobility (specificity) on the change in
trade protection in majoritarian democracies. Our
formal model predicts that an increase in intersec-
toral labor specificity leads to a rise in trade protec-
tion in majoritarian democracies. We find strong
statistical support for this prediction in three separate
samples (all, OECD, and non-OECD majoritarian
countries). The empirical results also remain robust
when we control for alternative explanations, apply
different estimation techniques, and use different
measures of trade protection.
21Granger causality tests indicate that we cannot reject the null
that Dimportduties does not cause DStrucspecificity, p 5 .67
(p 5 .74) and DLaborSpecificity, p 5 .70 (p 5 .78). We obtain
similar results from the Granger causality for other measures of
trade protection including the change in the Hiscox-Kastner
measure and change in tariff revenues.
22The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test fails to reject the
null of no autocorrelation in each lagged dependent variable
model. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in first dif-
ferences in the GMM models fail to reject the null that the error
term is not serially correlated. The RESET test for each model
rejects the null that each estimated model is misspecified. The
Jarque-Bera indicates that the residuals approximate a normal
distribution.
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TABLE 5 Effect of Labor Mobility on Change in Trade Protection in All Majoritarian Democracies
GMM levels regression
DV: DImport dutiesit DV: DHiscox-Kastner measure
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Lagged DV .106*** (.024) .115*** (.036) .276*** (.086) .317*** (.080)
Strucspecificity .322*** (.095) .342*** (.060)
Labor Specificity .405*** (.106) .254*** (.065)
Ln(GDP per capita) 2.044** (.021) 2.029** (.013) 20.062** (0.018) 20.044** (0.003)
Education 2.102 (.105) 2.104 (.144) 2.186 (.150) 2.159 (.363)
Log(population) .377 (.370) .259 (.446) .422 (.548) .386 (.511)
AGC Index 0.086 (0.090) 0.072 (0.084) 0.059 (0.048) 0.067 (0.061)
Real exch rate. .030*** (.009) .032*** (.010) 0.080** (0.014) 0.059*** (0.007)
Ln(Capital/labor) .0149 (.0121) .0214 (.0143) .0203 (.0140) .0312 (.0252)
Terms of Trade 20.140*** (0.039) 20.150*** (0.041) 20.137*** (0.045) 2.151*** (0.049)
GATT/WTO .043 (.032) .035 (.032) 0.045 (0.052) 0.020 (0.016)
Govt. spending .043*** (.012) .033*** (.011) .015*** (.004) .017*** (.004)
Party Strength 2.637 (.433) 2.287 (.247) 2.377 (.370) 2.259 (.446)
Veto Players 0.015 (0.030) 0.014 (0.055) 0.018 (0.041) 0.026 (0.088)
Partisanship 0.025 (0.019) 0.080 (0.059) 0.066 (0.048) 0.083 (0.096)
Presidential .008 (.006) .006 (.005) .013 (.015) .075 (.055)
Federal .006 (.0010) .007 (.005) 0.005 (0.008) 0.003 (0.002)
ENLP 0.091 (.0064) .0035 (.0038) 0.063 (0.085) 0.095 (0.108)
Transportation costs 2.0037 (.0070) 2.0048 (.0080) 2.0030 (.0027) 2.0041 (.0039)
agriculture(%GDP) .0328 (.0286) .0374 (.0277) .0711 (.0506) .0589 (.0802)
Unemployment benefit (%GDP) .016 (.010) .012 (.014) .012 (.031) .022 (.029)
Constant .491*** (.112) .400*** (.115) 0.743*** (0.129) 0.605*** (0.103)
Adjusted R2 .433 .442 .389 .403
N 411 411 411 411
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 6 Effect of Labor Mobility on Trade Protection in Separate Majoritarian Samples
GMM levels
regression
OECD Non-OECD
DV: Import dutiesit DV: DHiscox-Kastner measure DV: Import dutiesit DV: DHiscox-Kastner measure
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Lagged DV .211*** (.049) .257*** (.043) .138*** (.040) .182*** (.045) .251*** (.096) .299*** (.083) .260*** (.064) .219** (.090)
Strucspecificity 0.284*** (0.064) 0.397*** (0.074) .309*** (.110) .297*** (.065)
Labor Specificity 0.362*** (0.078) 0.341** (0.089) .397*** (.104) .378*** (.109)
Ln(GDP per capita) 20.077 (0.065) 20.186 (0.164) 20.060 (0.103) 20.163 (0.085) 2.047*** (.015) 2.051*** (.019) 2.044*** (.017) 2.051*** (.030)
Education 20.036** (0.011) 20.029** (0.005) 20.044*** (0.003) 20.017*** (0.003) .071 (.073) .081 (.067) .061 (.119) .062 (.110)
Ln(population) 0.086 (.0090) 0.077 (0.065) 0.082 (0.098) 0.073 (0.062) .088 (.079) .081 (.067) .054 (.060) .040 (.099)
AGC 0.175 (0.174) 0.195 (0.187) 0.113 (0.124) 0.146 (0.153) .054 (.060) .040 (.110) .087 (.063) .065 (.125)
Real exchange rate 0.011*** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.006) 0.049*** (0.0011) 0.027*** (0.0012) .095 (.080) .097 (.086) .058 (.052) .052 (.058)
Ln(Capital/Labor) .041 (.032) 2.047*** (.021) 2.032*** (.014) .058 (.049) .067 (.032) .058 (.052) .055 (.053) .090 (.068)
Terms of Trade 2.198 (.178) 2.145 (.170) 2.149 (.116) 2.125 (.114) 2.051*** (.020) 2.088*** (.024) 2.072*** (.031) 2.058** (.029)
GATT/WTO 20.028*** (0.011) 20.023*** (0.008) 20.021*** (0.009) 20.030*** (0.011) .031 (.038) .036 (.054) .017 (.0061) .068 (.083)
Govt. spending 2.032 (.041) 2.037 (.038) 2.025 (.026) 2.023 (.018) 2.098 (.112) 2.077 (.090) 2.086 (.127) 2.076 (.114)
Party Strength 20.101 (0.060) 20.091 (0.247) 20.103 (0.112) 20.097 (0.103) 2.065 (.097) 2.044 (.035) 2.021 (.063) 2.035 (.037)
Veto Players 20.019 (.0014) 2.0035 (.0038) 20.063 (0.085) 20.095 (0.108) 2.021 (.018) 2.091 (.080) 2.023 (.033) 2.030 (.029)
Partisanship .012*** (.004) .044*** (.017) .090*** (.022) .028*** (.004) .095 (.080) .053 (.071) .051 (.069) .097 (.038)
Presidential 20.018 (0.049) 20.031 (0.020) 20.027 (0.034) 0.034 (0.041) .017 (.032) .019 (.040) .010 (.025) .012 (.031)
Federal 20.000 (0.000) 20.000 (0.001) 20.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) .023 (.021) .021 (.040) .043 (.037) .047 (.033)
ENLP 0.040 (0.026) 0.022 (0.018) 0.023 (0.020) 0.027 (0.025) .027 (.023) .022 (.055) .051 (.046) .046 (.039)
Transportation costs 2.0375 (.0701) 2.0214 (.0629) 2.0231 (.0339) 2.0337 (.0218) 2.052 (.041) 2.047 (.038) 2.038 (.060) 2.052 (.040)
Agriculture(%GDP) .0433 (.0304) .0469 (.0459) .0439 (.0514) .0122 (.0314) .603 (.510) .524 (.570) .371 (.473) .581 (.767)
Unemployment
benefit (%GDP)
.0226 (.0597) .0212 (.0517) .0216 (.0199) .0327 (.0433) .011 (.0026) .0020 (.0057) .0039 (.0028) .0042 (.0030)
Constant .721*** (.106) .508*** (.102) .472*** (.085) .324*** (.045) .194** (.018) .196** (.015) .165*** (.056) .124*** (.061)
Adjusted R2 .533 .542 .511 .537 .242 .280 .279 .311
N 203 203 203 203 411 411 411 411
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Our article offers both theoretical and empirical
contributions to the literature on trade protection. In
the trade politics literature, Mayer’s (1984) theoretical
model of trade policy has had an enormous impact
(cited 296 times according to Google Scholar as of
September 2007), but his model treats factor mobility
as being dichotomous such that trade politics operates
in two separate worlds—either Heckscher-Ohlin or
Ricardo-Viner. Most ensuing work on trade politics
has inherited the spirit of such a dichotomy. Recent
theoretical and empirical work on factor mobility
(Hiscox 2002; Wacziarg and Wallack 2004), however,
demonstrated that factor mobility changes over time
and across countries, generating varying implications
for political coalitions and trade politics. We build on
this recent work and construct a formal model of how
the degree of labor specificity affects trade policy
changes in majoritarian democracies. We believe that
this analysis is the first in the literature that demon-
strates both formally and empirically that intersectoral
labor specificity has a significant impact on changes in
trade protection in majoritarian democracies. The
effect of labor specificity is empirically shown to be
more robust than other existing explanations of trade
policy, such as party strength, geographical concen-
tration, veto players, political partisanship, and inter-
national trade institutions.
Unlike most existing studies on trade policy which
focus almost exclusively on OECD democracies, we
test the impact of intersectoral labor specificity on
several measures of trade protection in a large data set
that includes both OECD and non-OECD majoritar-
ian democracies. Our empirical exercises significantly
increase the generalizability of our findings. They also
substantially extend the work by Hiscox (2002) who
examines the impact of labor specificity, but only uses
it to explain the type of political coalitions in six
advanced industrial democracies. Moreover, instead of
examining the level of trade protection, we focus on
the change in trade protection, which helps control for
the confounding impact of unobserved country char-
acteristics and provides a more rigorous test of the
underlying causal mechanism.
Our analysis offers two lessons to policy makers in
majoritarian democracies. Those interested in reduc-
ing trade barriers should adopt policies that decrease
nominal labor market rigidities, thus improving in-
tersectoral labor mobility. In addition, while promot-
ing free trade, governments should invest in assistance
programs that help workers with their adjustment
costs, since such programs make it less costly for
workers to move across sectors and may therefore
mitigate political opposition to free trade.
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